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Abstract
This paper proposes a panel stochastic frontier model with unobserved common
shocks to control cross-sectional dependence among individual firms. The novel fea-
ture is that we separate technical inefficiency (decision-dependent heterogeneity) from
the effects induced by individual heterogeneity (decision-independent) caused by un-
observed common shocks. We propose a feasible maximum likelihood method that
does not require estimating the effects of unobserved common shocks and discuss its
asymptotic properties. Monte Carlo simulations show that the proposed method has
satisfactory finite sample properties when cross-sectional dependence exists. Applica-
tion is illustrated by comparison of the efficiency of savings and commercial banking
industries in the US.
Keywords: fixed effects, common shocks, factor structure, cross-sectional dependence,
stochastic frontier
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1 Introduction
The use of panel data has become increasingly popular in stochastic frontier models, for
analysis of technical or cost inefficiencies of production units and financial institutions.
There are two approaches that have been employed to estimate time-varying technical
inefficiency, assuming the presence of firm heterogeneity (time-invariant(fixed/random ef-
fects) or time-variant). The first considers the linear panel models without imposing
distributional assumptions on technical inefficiency; see Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles
(1990), Han, Orea and Schmidt (2005), Lee (2006), Ahn, Lee and Schmidt (2001, 2007,
hereafter ALS), Mastromarco, Serlenga and Shin (2012, 2013, 2015, hereafter MSS) and
Filippini and Tosetti (2014), among others. The generalized method of moments (GMM,
including the least squared method) is adapted in these studies to estimate stochastic
frontier models with time-varying technical inefficiency. The second approach assumes
that technical inefficiency is random and specific distributional assumptions are required;
see Greene (2003, 2005a, b) and Wang and Ho (2010), among others. The maximum likeli-
hood (ML) method, based on suitable distributional assumptions, is suggested to estimate
the time-varying technical inefficiency.
However, to the best of our knowledge, except ALS, MSS and Filippini and Tosetti,
who tried to use the factor structure to capture the time-varying technical inefficiency
in the stochastic frontier panel data model based on the first approach, there are no
other related papers taking into account the factor structure, which has been discussed
based on the second approach. It is difficult to take the factor structure into account
in the ML framework not only because these two approaches have different estimation
strategies but also because they have different fundamental philosophies of time-varying
technical inefficiency. More specifically, the former treats time-varying firm heterogeneity
characterized by factor structure as a part of inefficiency, while the latter explicitly views
firm heterogeneity (fixed/random effects, time-invariant) as something different from time-
varying inefficiency, named “true” fixed/random effects. Similarly, the same issue arises
if the assumption of “true” fixed/random effects is relaxed by allowing the time-varying
property, that is, what can be treated as inefficiency and what cannot be. As mentioned
by Koopmans (1951),
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“The “technique” employed in production is itself the result of managerial
choice (going beyond the discarding of unwanted factor quantities). Managers
choose between, or employ efficient combinations of several processes to obtain
in some sense best results” —Koopmans (1951), p.34
inefficiency can be regarded as the situation where managers “do not” choose an efficient
way to generate the expected output from available capital and labour, which includes the
choice of technology as well as managerial behaviour. In sum, efficiency should be related
to the manager’s decision. Therefore, the relatively clear way to distinguish the time-
varying heterogeneity from inefficiency is that the effects of the former are not relevant
to efficiency given that they are attributable to firm characteristics which the manager
“cannot” change by decisions in the long-run (relatively).
The factor structure used in ALS, MSS and Filippini and Tosetti, by definition, consists
of time-varying factors and the corresponding loadings. As mentioned in Bai (2009), these
loadings could be innate ability, perseverance and industriousness or firms’ heterogeneity
mentioned in Greene (2005a, b), among others; and, factors are the prices (losses) caused
by these unmeasured characteristics when facing time-varying economic environment. In
fact, some of these are inborn; for instance, firms’ heterogeneities cannot be changed easily
but still have impacts on time-varying economic events. Therefore, the estimated technical
inefficiency might be distorted when we incorrectly model inefficiency. For example, it is
hard to conclude that local and small banks that suffer less from global financial shocks
are in general more efficient than multinational banks.
Because of these properties, in our model, the error term is split into three components.
The first component is “decision-independent heterogeneity (time-varying),” captured by
the factor structure. The term “decision-independent” is used to emphasize that this
component is irrelevant to efficiency because a manager cannot change it by himself or
herself. Moreover, the “true” fixed effects, as defined in Greene (2003, 2005a, b), Wang
and Ho (2010) and Chen, Wang and Schmidt (2014) can be treated as a special case while
we let the factors (prices) be a constant. The second component captures the “decision-
dependent heterogeneity (time-varying)”, which can be regarded as a measure of “technical
inefficiency” similar to most stochastic frontier panel data models. To estimate technical
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inefficiency, the scaling function proposed by Wang and Schmidt (2002) is used, that is,
technical (managerial) inefficiency can be explained by some relevant variables according
to the economic theory or organizational behaviour. The last component is a random
shock. 1
In addition to the “decision-independent” heterogeneity, factor structure can also spec-
ify the presence of cross-sectional dependence and the correlation between regressors and
factors which are prevalent features in panel data. Ignoring correlation between regressors
and factors induced by these events can be problematic in estimation of panel regressions;
see Andrews (2005), Pesaran (2006), and Bai (2009) for further discussion.2
This paper proposes a panel stochastic frontier model with unobserved factor structure
to capture the unobservable “decision-independent” heterogeneity and accommodate the
possible phenomenon of cross-sectional dependence among individual firms. To overcome
the endogeneity caused by the “decision-independent” heterogeneity, which is irrelevant
to inefficiency and to estimate the time-varying technical inefficiency, we follow Pesaran
(2006) and propose a likelihood-based method.3 The transformed model obtained by mul-
tiplying an annihilator matrix consisting of the cross-sectional averages of the dependent
variable and regressors should allow filtering of decision-independent heterogeneity (in-
cluding true fixed/random effects) asymptotically. However, in our setup, the time-varying
technical inefficiency in the right hand side is needed for estimation, which makes the an-
nihilator matrix dependent upon the parameters. To address this issue, we first construct
an open ball in the parameter space around the true value of parameters and show that
the maximizer of the log-likelihood function calculated from the transformed model (fea-
sible approximated log-likelihood function) will occur in this open ball with probability
1. We then show that under some regular conditions, the difference between the feasible
approximated log-likelihood function and the one that treats decision-independent hetero-
1This specification is also robust to the “omitted variable” problem in the scaling function while the
omitted inefficiency can be decomposed to form a factor structure.
2Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) have mentioned that although some shocks(factors) are unobserved
by econometricians, they are potentially predictable by firms when they are making input decisions, such as
expected defect rates, expected down-time due to machine breakdowns, or expected government policies.
This is the classic endogeneity problem whereby the firm’s optimal choice of inputs will generally be
correlated with these unobserved shocks.
3These effects could referred to as common correlated effects (Pesaran, 2006) or interactive effects (Bai,
2009).
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geneity as known is negligible and is faster than the usual rate of (NT )−1/2 in this open
ball. Thus, we can assure that the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimators are
the same as those obtained from the transformed model which treats decision-independent
heterogeneity as known when (T,N)→∞ jointly and T/N → 0.
There are a few additional features of the proposed method. First, it possesses the scal-
ing property proposed by Wang and Schmidt (2002) and Wang and Ho (2010). In contrast
to ALS, MSS and Filippini and Tosetti the scaling-property enables investigation of how
firms’ efficiency levels vary with exogenous variables.4 Second, our approach can be easily
extended to estimate the cost function and cost inefficiency. We also conduct some Monte
Carlo simulations to investigate the finite sample properties of the proposed method. The
simulation results show that the proposed estimator has significantly smaller biases and
MSEs than the within-transformation estimator when unobservable time-varying decision-
independent heterogeneity exhibits in the data.
To illustrate its relevance, the proposed approach is applied to analyze cost inefficiency
of the savings and commercial banking industry in the U.S. Recent studies on bank ef-
ficiency do not deal with effects of time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity; see,
for example, Lensink et al. (2008) and Sun and Chang (2010). The empirical results show
that bank efficiency improved before 2006 and the estimated inefficiency index might be
biased if we do not take into account the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the panel
stochastic frontier model with time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity and dis-
cusses asymptotic properties of the proposed estimation procedure. Section 3 conducts
some Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the small-sample properties of the proposed
estimator. An empirical application is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this
paper. All mathematical proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4However, we do not compare the proposed model with the one used in Ahn et al. among others because
these two model specifications have different philosophies of time-varying technical inefficiency.
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2 Panel Stochastic Frontier Model
2.1 The Model
Consider a panel stochastic frontier model with the following specifications:
yit = αi + x
′
itβ + λ
′
ift + vit − uit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (1)
xit = Ai + τ
′
ift + eit (2)
uit = hitu
∗
i = h(z
′
itδ)u
∗
i , (3)
where yit is the logarithm of output of firm i in period t, xit is a k×1 vector of the logarithm
of inputs in this production system, αi denotes individual fixed effects, and vit is a zero-
mean idiosyncratic error. Let ft be a r × 1 vector of price/cost to unobserved common
economic events, λi be the heterogeneous impact of common shocks on firm i, and uit is
the term used to measure inefficiency. The regressors are also affected by individual fixed
effects, Ai, and common shocks, where Ai is a k × 1 vector which is correlated with αi,
and τi denotes a r×k vector of factor loadings. The specification not only allows for cross-
sectional dependence through three error components but makes for correlation between
time-varying heterogeneity and regressors. The idiosyncratic error eit is independent of
all observations on vit and uit. Finally, let hit be a positive function of firms’ inefficiency
determinants zit, u
∗
i ∼ N+(µ, σ2u), where the distribution is truncated from below at zero
such that u∗i > 0. This specification is referred to as the scaling property, which allows
us to estimate coefficients and inefficiency in a one-step procedure.5 The scaling property
also allows the inefficiency uit to be correlated over time for a given individual.
A number of features in these specifications are of interest. Firstly, in contrast to
the conventional stochastic frontier literature, our model can distinguish the decision-
independent heterogeneity, λ′ift, from technical inefficiency, uit. The decision-independent
heterogeneity is used to capture the heterogeneous impacts of unobservable common eco-
5Conditional on zit, the scaling property means that technical inefficiency equals some function of
exogenous variables times a one-sided random varaible distributed independently of zit; see Wang and
Schmidt (2002).
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nomic events, which can not be controlled by managers. Secondly, an endogeneity problem
may arise because unobserved decision-independent heterogeneity may affect both firms’
input decisions, xit, and their outputs, yit.
6 Thirdly, the conventional fixed-effect stochas-
tic frontier models proposed by Greene (2005a, b) and Wang and Ho (2010) are special
cases of our specification with ft = 1. Fourthly, compared with Ahn et al. among others,
our specification enables us to directly investigate the effects of observed variables zit on
inefficiency and then obtains meaningful policy inferences to improve efficiency.7
2.2 Estimation
In this section we propose a transformation to control for the decision-independent hetero-
geneity (referred to as the CCE transformation8), and then apply the maximum likelihood
method to consistently estimate the parameters in the stochastic frontier model (1) − (3).
Define
M¯0 = IT − H¯0(H¯′0H¯0)−1H¯′0,
where
H¯0 = (D, Y¯, h¯0µ
+
0 ),
D = (d1, ..., dT )
′ = (1, ..., 1)′ is a T × 1 vector of ones, Y¯ = (y¯, X¯) is the cross-sectional
average of (yi,Xi), h¯0 denotes the cross-sectional average of hi evaluated at δ0, and
µ+0 denotes the true value of µ
+ =
φ(−µ
σu
)
1−Φ(−µ
σu
)
σu, the mean of the truncated normal u
∗
i ∼
N+
(
µ, σ2u
)
. Φ and φ represent the cumulative density function and probability density
function of a standard normal distribution, respectively. Throughout this paper, we use
the subscript “0” to indicate that the parameter is evaluated at the true value. The rank
of M¯0, which depends on the dimension of H¯0 = (D, Y¯, h¯0µ+), is T − dim(H¯0) = T − s.
6To solve the endogeneity problem, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that
investment and intermediate goods can be used as the proxies of these unobserved state variables; however,
they may not be valid in the cost function analysis.
7Notice that zit is allowed to include unobserved common shocks, ft.
8This transformation share the same spirit with Pesaran (2006) to deal with common correlated ef-
fects (CCE).
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Transform (1) by multiplying it by M¯0,
M¯0yi = M¯0Xiβ + M¯0εi + M¯0Fλi, (4)
where M¯0εi = M¯0vi − M¯0ui. In particular, vi = (vi1, ..., viT )′ and ui = (ui1, ..., uiT )′,
thus, M¯0vi ∼ N (0,Π0), Π0 = σ2vM¯0, and M¯0ui = M¯0h (z′iδ) u∗i . Furthermore F =
(f1,f2, ...,fT )
′ is a T × r matrix. Since M¯0 is an idempotent matrix, we solve the non-
invertible problem of M¯0 based on the method of Khatri (1968). In addition, following
Wang and Ho (2010), we obtain the conditional log-likelihood function for each i as
lnLi(θ) = −1
2
(T − s) (ln (2π) + lnσ2v)− 12 (yi −Xiβ)′ M¯0Π−0 M¯0 (yi −Xiβ)
+
1
2
(
µ2
∗
σ2
∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)
+ ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))
,
(5)
where
µ∗ =
µ/σ2u − (yi −Xiβ)′ M¯0Π−0 M¯0hi
h′iM¯0Π
−
0 M¯0hi + 1/σ
2
u
(6)
σ2
∗
=
1
h′iM¯0Π
−
0 M¯0hi + 1/σ
2
u
. (7)
The model parameters can be estimated numerically by maximizing the objective function,
Q˜NT (θ) = (NT )
−1
∑N
i=1 lnLi(θ), where θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd is an unknown parameter vector,
where d is the number of parameters.
Notice that the above estimation procedure is designed for the production system. For
the cost function, the model should be modified as
yit = αi + x
′
itβ + λ
′
ift + vit + uit, (8)
where yit denotes the total cost of firm i in period t. The individual log-likelihood function
is similar to (5) except that
µ∗ =
µ/σ2u + (yi −Xiβ)′ M¯0Π−0 M¯0hi
h′iM¯0Π
−
0 M¯0hi + 1/σ
2
u
.
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2.3 The Properties of the Proposed Method
By an analogous argument to Pesaran (2006), we will show that M¯0 can filter out the un-
observable time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity in our three error components
stochastic panel data model. To complete the inferences of consistency and the asymptotic
normality of the proposed estimator, the following assumptions are used throughout this
paper.
Assumption 1.
The error structure contains vit, eit and u
∗
i , which are distributed independently of each
other and of the regressors xit,zit, ∀ i, t. We also assume that
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
u∗i ∼ N+(µ, σ2u),
where the variances σ2v and σ
2
u are bounded.
Assumption 2. The common factors dt and ft are covariance stationary with absolute
summable autocovariances, distributed independently of vit, eit and u
∗
i , ∀ i, t.
Assumption 3. The unobserved factor loadings λi with mean η and τi with mean τ ,
specifically, λi = η + ηi and τi = τ + ϑi. Furthermore, they are mutually independent
and independent of vit, eit, u
∗
i , and the common factors dt, ft, ∀ i, t. In particular, ‖λi‖
and ‖τi‖ are bounded with a finite second moment.
Assumption 4. The function of the determinants h(z′itδ) should be assumed to have
finite first, second, and fourth moments and to be distributed independently of vit, eit and
u∗i ∀ i, t.
Assumption 1 is a standard distributional assumption for the stochastic frontier model.
Assumptions 2 − 4 are similar to the assumptions used in Pesaran (2006) for the panel
model with multi-factor error structures.
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We rewrite the stochastic frontier model (1) − (3) as
 yit
xit
 =
 1 β′
0 Ik
 αi
Ai
 dt +
 1 β′
0 Ik
 λ′i
τ ′i
ft −
 uit
0(k×1)
+
 vit + β′eit
eit

or
Yit = B
′
idt +C
′
ift −Uit + ξit;
here dt = 1. After taking the cross-sectional average under the equal weight, we have
Y¯t = B¯
′dt + C¯
′ft − U¯t + ξ¯t, (9)
where U¯t = (u¯t,0
′)′ and u¯t = N
−1
∑N
i=1 uit. In the light of Pesaran (2006), we obtain
ξ¯t
IP−→ 0 and C¯ IP−→ C as N →∞, whereC =
[
λ τ
] 1 0′
β Ik
. Under the assumption
Rank(C¯) = r ≤ k + 1, it can be shown that
ft − (CC′)−1C(Y¯t − B¯′dt + U¯t) IP−→ 0. (10)
Thus, the set {D, y¯, X¯, U¯} can be regarded as the proxy of the factor structure. Based on
Pesaran (2006), to proxy the common factors in our model, we could use
H¯∗ = [ D y¯ X¯ u¯ ].
Notice that u∗i is not observed in the data. To overcome this problem, we propose using
h¯0µ
+
0 as a proxy for u¯. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, we have
u¯t − h¯t,0µ+0 IP−→ 0
as N →∞, where h¯0 = (h¯1,0, ..., h¯T,0)′. It follows that
ft − (CC′)−1C
Y¯t − B¯′dt +
 h¯t,0µ+0
0
 IP−→ 0. (11)
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By substituting h¯0µ
+
0 in H¯
∗, we obtain
H¯0 = [ D y¯ X¯ h¯0µ
+
0
].
The transformed matrix which consists of H¯0 could work because we construct this
matrix by using the true value of δ and µ+. However, it is not reasonable to assume
that we know these values ex ante. Therefore, we shall prove that the deviation of δ and
µ+ should lead to the transformed log-likelihood function not converging to the correctly
specified log-likelihood function and being less than it with probability one when this
deviation does not vanish as the sample size increases. To show this property, we define
two log-likelihood functions after transformation by using the transformed matrixs M¯0
and M¯. In contrast to M¯0, here, M¯ denotes the transformed matrix which is evaluated at
estimated δ and µ+. The first of these two functions is the correctly specified log-likelihood
function considering the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity,
QNT (θ) =(NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(T − s) (ln (2π) + lnσ2v)
− 1
2
(yi −Xiβ − F0λi,0)′M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ − F0λi,0)
+
1
2
(
µ2c
σ2
∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)
+ ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µc
σ∗
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))}
, (12)
where µc =
µ/σ2u+(yi−Xiβ−F0λi,0)
′M¯Π−M¯hi
h′iM¯Π
−M¯hi+1/σ2u
. The second one is the log-likelihood function
ignoring this heterogeneity,
Q˜NT (θ) =(NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(T − s) (ln (2π) + lnσ2v)
− 1
2
(yi −Xiβ)′M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ).
+
1
2
(
µ2
∗
σ2
∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)
+ ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))}
. (13)
The main differences between these two functions can be disclosed as follows. In (12), since
we assume that the factor structure is known ex ante in both factors and corresponding
loadings, the model can be correctly specified without ignoring the effects of the factor
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structure. Thus, the factor structure appears in the second line of (12) which is the same
as the well-known normal distribution with location (mean) and scale (variance) parts.
On the other hand, the log-likelihood function defined in (13) is more realistic because
we usually cannot observe these factors and their corresponding effects. Thus, the factor
structure does not come out in the location part and µ∗ of (13). We replace µ∗ by µc
in the third line to characterize the truncated property. This log-likelihood function is
“feasible” because the difference between (12) and (13) can be ignored under assumptions
1− 4 and some regular conditions,
Assumption 5. (i) Let Q0(θ) = E[QNT (θ)], Q˜0(θ) = E[Q˜NT (θ)], and Q0(θ) is uniquely
maximized at θ0; (ii) Θ is compact; (iii) Q0 and Q˜0 are continuous at θ; and (iv) QNT (θ)
and Q˜NT (θ) converge uniformly in probability to Q0(θ) and Q˜0(θ), respectively.
We state the main properties of these two functions in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let B = {θ0 + bNTd : ‖d‖ ≤ K}, where bNT converges to 0 as N,T →
∞, along with Assumptions 1-5, the “ feasible” log-likelihood function has the following
properties:
1. |QNT (θ)− Q˜NT (θ)| IP−→ 0 when θ ∈ B.
2. P[QNT (θ0)− Q˜NT (θ) > 0] = 1, when θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ,
as N,T →∞ jointly.
The first result of this proposition indicates that if we construct an open ball, B,
with the center θ0 and its radius converging to zero, we can show that the “feasible”
log-likelihood function is uniformly close to the correctly specified likelihood function for
all θ ∈ B. In addition, the second result implies that, with probability one, there is a
positive difference between QNT (θ0) and Q˜NT (θ), and it does not vanish as N,T →∞ if
θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ. This implies that if we consider a candidate solution of θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ, named
θ′, we have QNT (θ0) > Q˜NT (θ
′) in probability one. In other words, θ′ is not the solution
of the “feasible” likelihood function because we can always find another solution θ′′ ∈ B
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which is closer to θ0 to make Q˜NT (θ
′′) close to QNT (θ0). Consequently, these results lead
to the following theorem about the consistency of the “feasible” log-likelihood function.
Theorem 1. Assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Then θ˜
IP−→ θ0 as N,T →
∞ jointly, where θ˜ is obtained from maximizing the objective function Q˜NT (θ).
Theorem 1 shows that, instead of maximizing the correctly specified log-likelihood
function, if we maximize the “feasible” log-likelihood function, then we can obtain a
consistent estimator of θ0. Although it is expected that
√
NT (θˆ − θ0) has asymptotic
normality, derived from maximizing the correctly specified log-likelihood function in (12),
the behavior of θ˜ obtained from Q˜NT (θ) is not trivial. Because the “feasible” function is
an approximate function of the true one, we can not apply the traditional method, such
as the mean value theorem, to obtain the asymptotic behavior of its estimator. Instead,
we apply the framework which is used in Kristensen and Shin (2012). In their paper,
they show that as long as the difference of two objective functions converges to zero faster
than the usual convergence rate of estimators, for example root-NT , the two estimators
obtained from these two functions will share the same asymptotic behavior. Furthermore,
since the property of smoothness in log-likelihood function Q˜NT (θ) is the same as QNT (θ),
both of them have the same rate of convergence, root-NT . Therefore, in the following
proposition, we show that under what conditions, the difference between QNT (θ) and
Q˜NT (θ), will converge to zero after multiplying by root-NT . We summarize the result of
the requirement to ensure a stronger convergence of QNT (θ) and Q˜NT (θ) as follows:
Proposition 2. Using the assumptions in Proposition 1 we have the following result:
√
NT |QNT (θ) − Q˜NT (θ)| IP−→ 0 when θ ∈ B and bNT = op (CNT ), where CNT =
min{N−1/2, T−1/2, (NT )−1/4}, as N,T →∞ jointly and T/N → 0.
This result discloses the required converge rate of bNT to guarantee the stronger con-
vergence property of QNT (θ) and Q˜NT (θ). This minimum rate of convergence is slower
than the converge rate of estimators θˆ and θ˜ and therefore proves the hold of the property
of Proposition 2 in our “feasible” log-likelihood function. That is, the difference between
QNT (θ) and Q˜NT (θ) after multiplying by root-NT converges to 0 as N,T → ∞ jointly
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and T/N → 0. This result is crucial because it can be used to show that the asymptotic
behavior of θ˜ is asymptotically equivalent to θˆ obtained from QNT (θ) by using Lemma 1
in the Appendix. We state the above result as the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Using the assumptions in Theorem 1 and an additional assumption (L1):
Q0(θ) is three times continuously differentiable and its derivatives satisfying: (i)
√
NTS(θ0)
D−→ N(0, {E[−H(θ0)]}−1); (ii) H(θ0) IP−→ E[H(θ0)]; (iii) maxj=1,...,d supθ || ∂Q0(θ)∂θ∂θ′∂θj || =
Op(1), we have the following result:
√
NT (θ˜ − θ0) D−→ N(0, {E[−H˜(θ0)]}−1), and E[H˜(θ0)] IP−→ E[H(θ0)],
as N,T → ∞ jointly and T/N → 0. Here, S(θ0) = ∂Q0(θ)∂θ |θ0 , and H˜(θ0) is the Hessian
matrix of Q˜0(θ) and H(θ0) is the Hessian matrix of Q0(θ)at θ0, respectively.
Compared with ALS, MSS, and Filippini and Tosetti, our estimation allows us to focus
on zit that is concerned with measuring inefficiency and to treat time-varying decision-
independent heterogeneity as a part of the factor structure which can be filtered out by our
transformation. According to the above asymptotic properties, our estimation still have
asymptotic normality and is asymptotically equivalent to the function which treats the
factor structure as the observed structure. Furthermore, the GMM-type(including OLS)
method can not distinguish between time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity and
technical inefficiency.
2.4 The Inefficiency Index
It is important to measure the inefficiency index in applications. How, then, can the
inefficiency index be estimated after the proposed transformation? We follow Wang and
Ho (2010), who use the conditional expectation estimator proposed by Jondrow et al.
(1982), namely, E(ui|εi) evaluated at εi = εˆi, to construct the inefficiency index. In the
same manner, the inefficiency index in our estimation is the conditional expectation of uit
on the vector of the transformed εi = vi − ui, i.e., M¯εi. Note that M¯εi is evaluated at
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̂¯Mεi, and following Wang and Ho (2010), the conditional inefficiency index is
E
(
ui|M¯εi
)
= h(z′iδ)
µ∗ + φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
σ∗
Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
 (14)
3 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the finite sample prop-
erties of our proposed estimator. Consider the following stochastic production frontier
model for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T :
yit = αi + xitβ + λ
′
ift + vit − exp(z′itδ)u∗i (15)
xit = Ai + τ
′
ift + eit, (16)
where αi ∼ U(0, 1), xit is a regressor, ft ∼ N(0, σf ) is a common factor, σ2f = 0.2, factor
loadings λi and τi follow N(1, 0.2), and zit consists of zit,1 ∼ N(0, 1) and zit,2 = t, which
implies that the inefficiency is time-varying, vit ∼ N(0, σ2v), u∗i ∼ N+(µ, σ2u), vit and u∗i
are mutually independent, and eit ∼ N(0, 1). The parameter values are
(β, δ1, δ2, σ
2
v , σ
2
u, µ) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5).
N = {50, 100, 200, 400}, T = {5, 10, 20}, and the number of replications is 1,000 in all
simulations.
To demonstrate the importance of our transformation in the presence of time-varying
decision-independent heterogeneity, we also compare our method with the estimation
which only takes the fixed effects into account by means of the Within transformation.
Hereafter, we let Within denote the latter method and let CCE denote our estimator.
Our simulation results are reported in Table 1. We find that CCE tends to have a
smaller bias than Within for all parameters over all combinations of (N,T ) except for δ2
when T = 5. Moreover, CCE uniformly has a smaller RMSE than Within as T ≥ 10.
Even when T = 5, the RMSE ratios, ψ =RMSE(Within)/RMSE(CCE), increase with
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the increase in N . For example, the ψ of δˆ is 0.614 when (N,T ) = (50, 5) and increases
to 1.036, which indicates that CCE has a smaller RMSE than Within by 3.6%, when
(N,T ) = (50, 5). It is also worth noting that the bias and the RMSE of CCE decline
as T or N increases for all parameters. By contrast, due to failing to control for the
time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity, the Within estimators of β and δ are
still biased and cannot be improved even when T or N is large.
For robustness, we further consider the finite sample performance for different degrees
of cross-sectional correlation by adjusting the magnitude of σf . In particular, we consider
three settings with σ2f = 0.1, 1 and 0, respectively. As we can see from model (1), when
σf is smaller, our model is closer to the model with fixed effects only and the time-varying
decision-independent heterogeneity become less important. The last case implies the model
which has only fixed effects. Furthermore, instead of letting zit,2 = t in h(z
′
itδ), we consider
group-specific inefficiency by letting zit,2 be a group dummy such that zit,2 = 1 for any
unit in Group 2; otherwise zit,2 = 0. The members in Group 1 are randomly assigned in
each repetition with the number of units N1 = ⌊U(0.3, 0.7) × N⌋, regardless of whether
⌊A⌋ is the integer closest to A. The other group has N−N1 units. The group membership
is known in advance. The parameters in this set of simulations take the following values
(β, δ1, δ2, σ
2
v , σ
2
u, µ) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5).
The results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 with T = {10, 20}, respectively. Since
we have similar patterns to the previous simulation, that is, the bias and the RMSE of
CCE decline as T or N increases, we do not report the case when T = 5. It will be
clear from these results that the bias for Within seems to be less serious as σ2f = 0.1, and
becomes more significant as σ2f = 1. More importantly, the performance of our approach
is generally better than that of Within approach even when σ2f = 0.1, which demonstrates
that our method is still robust even when the degree of time-varying property to decision-
independent heterogeneity is small in the data. In particular, the estimates of σ2v and σ
2
u for
the Within approach seem to be overestimated in the presence of the time-varying decision-
independent heterogeneity. On the contrary, CCE provides less unbiased estimates even
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when σ2f = 0.1. However, the CCE estimator tends to be less efficient when the model
only contains fixed effects.
We next consider the experiment in which both xit and zit are correlated with an
unobservable common factor. We set uit = exp(z
′
itδ)u
∗
i to ensure that uit is positive. Let
zit = γ
′
ift + ez,it, (17)
and zit is correlated with ft. We still have two variables z1,it and z2,it which can affect uit.
In particular, the factor loadings γi,1 and γi,2 follow N(1, 0.4) and N(1, 0.2), respectively,
ft ∼ N(0, 0.6) to indicate that the factor is important in this model, and each of ez,it fol-
lows N(0, 1). xit is similar to the former setting. The parameters in this set of simulations
take the following values
(β, δ1, δ2, σ
2
v , σ
2
u, µ) = (0.5, 0.2,−0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4).
Table 4 summarizes the simulation results. A general finding is that our proposed
method is relatively much better than Within in all combinations. The bias is almost 0 in
CCE except for σ2u, whereas the bias of Within is serious not only for β but also for the δ’s.
Notice that the small bias of σ2u in CCE will decrease as N increases. On the contrary, the
bias of σ2u in Within is enormous, and it is not surprising because Within does not control
the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity, and the components from the biased
hˆit will induce large variations in u
∗
i .
In general, the simulation shows the clear results that the estimation without control-
ling the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity will bias the estimates. We also
conduct a similar simulation for the cost frontier model, which is not reported here. Its
pattern again confirms the importance of taking the time-varying decision-independent
heterogeneity into account in a stochastic frontier model and the findings are similar to
the findings summarized in Tables 1 − 4.
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4 Empirical Study
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, banks in theU.S. suffered from a dif-
ficult environment. Given that this crisis was induced by a rise in subprime mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures, a key question that arises concerns for the performance
before the said crisis of the banks in the U.S., two basic types of banks co-exist in the
market, namely, savings and commercial banks. These two types are generally character-
ized by their ownership structure and by the services they provide. In the U.S., savings
institutions may be owned by shareholders (stock), or by their depositors and borrow-
ers (mutual). Based on the agency theory and property rights theory addressed by the
seminal works of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983), in contrast
to commercial banks which are generally stock corporations, savings banks may not ap-
pear to engage in skimping behavior. Particularly in the period before the crisis, as we
know, savings banks had to hold a certain proportion of their loan portfolio in housing-
related assets to preserve their charter. Therefore, these savings banks faced the problem
of overbuilding during the boom period, which resulted in their increasing loans, as well
as inappropriate government regulation before the financial crisis. In particular, more
and more loans to higher-risk borrowers were offered by the lenders, thus revealing the
inappropriate managerial behavior of savings banks before the crisis.
Another aim of this paper is to examine the change in efficiency that resulted from
the banking consolidation. According to data complied by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the number of commercial banks had fallen to 6,279 at the end of
2011, a drop about 49.1% since 1990. Similarly, the number of savings institutions fell from
2,815 to 1,067 over the same period. There is still a debate between the issues of efficiency
and the banking consolidation. In general, the consolidation will increase the market
power, and therefore lead to a decline in competition. From the viewpoint of competitive
efficiency, the efficiency of banks should be lower in this scenario. Put differently, an
increase in competition will wear the bank’s pricing power away, and increase the bank’s
risk taking behavior; see Berger et al. (2009b) and Beck, Jonghe and Schepens (2013).
Hence, an increase in competition could lead to lower profit and higher cost under the
same allocation of inputs; in other words, cost inefficiency. To explore the relationship
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between banking consolidation and efficiency, we focus on the banks which have not failed
or have merged with other banks. In other words, we collect data for the banks that have
existed over the whole sample period under consideration. By building on this situation,
we can show, on average, the effects of consolidation without the failed banks .
4.1 Data
We evaluate the cost efficiency of commercial and savings banks in the U.S. by using the
proposed transformation allowing for the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity
in the stochastic frontier model. The conventional intermediation approach to measuring
the cost faced by a bank is used in this study. Total cost is defined as the sum of interest
expenses and non-interest expense. Following Berger et al. (2009a) and Sun and Chang
(2010), we consider the following output variables in the cost function: total loans (TL),
other earning assets (OEA), total deposits (TD) and liquid assets (LA). We additionally
consider the price of capital (PC) and funds (PF), defined by the ratio of non-interest
expenses to total fixed assets and the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits, respec-
tively, as our input prices. In order to guarantee linear homogeneity in the input prices of
the cost function, we re-scale TC and PC by PF.
The cost function used here is
ln
(
TC
PF
)
it
= β0 ln
(
PC
PF
)
it
+ β1 ln TLit + β2 lnOEAit (18)
+ β3 ln TDit + β4 ln LAit + λift + vit + uit.
To allow the inefficiency across banks to be measured by explanatory variables, we use the
scaling function proposed by Wang and Schmidt (2002). The specification of the scaling
function is as follows
h(z′itδ) = exp(δ1 ln TAit + δ2ETAit + δ3ROAAit +Type), (19)
where TA denotes the total assets less liquid assests, ETA denotes the equity to assets,
and ROAA denotes the return on average assets. These three variables are commonly
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used to control the efficiency. TA measures the relationship between the efficiency and
the size of the bank. ETA can represent the equity position of a bank and avoid the scale
bias making large banks more efficient (Berger and Mester, 1997). In addition, ETA may
reflect the risk preference of a manager of a bank. ROAA can be regarded as a proxy for
manager ability. A type dummy variable is also included to capture the effect of different
of types of banks.
We consider a balanced panel data set covering 1994-2007 with 223 banks in the U.S.
The data are taken from Bankscope and are inflation-adjusted. Except for ETA and
ROAA, all the other variables are transformed into natural logs. Table 5 presents the
descriptive statistics of these variables.
4.2 Empirical Results
The empirical results obtained by our approaches are summarized in the right panel of
Table 6. We report not only the estimates of the coefficients in the cost function β’s,
but also the estimates of the parameters in the inefficiency equation δ’s. For comparison
purposes, we additionally show the results based on the Within approach in the left panel
of Table 6.9
Let us consider the coefficients in the cost function using our approach first. The
coefficient of the input prices (PC/PF) is positive at the 1% significance level, which
indicates that a higher capital cost results in a higher total cost and is similar to the
empirical results of Lensink et al. (2008) and Sun and Chang (2010). As expected, the
output variables, such as TL, TD and LA, also have positive effects on the total cost.
While the estimated coefficient of OEA is negative, it has a rather small effect in contrast
to other variables. The empirical results from the Within approach are qualitatively
similar to those based on our CCE approach. However, the former tends to deliver smaller
estimated coefficients of TL, TD and LA than our approach.
Next, we turn our focus to the coefficients of the inefficiency equation. The coefficient
for TA, equal to -0.202, is negative and significant at the 1% level, which implies that
9We also consider the trend effects while implementing the Within approach by adding t and t2 along
with intercept to form the idempotent matrix M.
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larger banks are on average more efficient than smaller banks as TA is regarded as a proxy
for bank size. The estimated sign of this coefficient is different from that in Han et al.
(2005) and Sun and Chang (2010). However, Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) pointed out
that the relationship between bank size and efficiency is inverse U-shaped, which implies
that the efficiency increases with size and then decreases thereafter. In our data, almost
90% of banks are small and medium-sized and, therefore, are more likely to have a positive
relationship with efficiency.10 In addition, our results indicate that an increase in ETA
will raise inefficiency, which can be explained in two ways. First, ETA can be regarded
as a proxy for the risk-preference of a manager. A higher equity position reveals that the
manager is risk-averse and might not be good at using financial leverage to increase the size
of a bank, which indicates that the manager may not seek to minimize the cost. Second,
inefficiency will lead to a lower profit and put equity in a high position. Furthermore,
the negative relationship between ROAA and inefficiency is also in line with Lensink et
al. (2008).
Although the ROAA should exhibit a negative relationship with inefficiency as pointed
out by Lensink et al. (2008), we can not find strong evidence to link ROAA with efficiency,
even if the sign is negative and has only a very slight effect.
Furthermore, the type dummy variable for identifing the different performance shows
the positive effects on commercial banks. The effect is not only statistically, but also eco-
nomically large. The result shown in the table is equal to -0.263, which provides strong
evidence to show that savings banks are less efficient than their commercial counterparts.
It supports the view that savings banks had poor managerial behavior before the crisis
when they faced overbuilding during the boom period, increasing loans and inappropri-
ate government regulation and did not tend to minimize their costs. On the contrary,
commercial banks were more efficient.
Comparing the results of different approaches further reflects the importance of control-
ling the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity in the stochastic frontier model.
The second column of the table from the alternative approach which only takes account
10Following Berger et al. (2009a), the classification of bank size is defined as follows. The bank’s size
is considered to be small if its assets are less than or equal to $1 billion, its size is medium if the bank’s
assets are greater than $1 billion but less than $20 billion, and the bank is large if its assets exceed $20
billion.
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of the fixed effects provides different results. It shows that the effects of ETA, ROAA
and the type dummy are completely opposite to our results. Despite the ETA, it is
uncanny to explain the relationship between ROAA and efficiency that is negative. 11
Moreover, the result goes against the traditional concept, which implies that the savings
banks are efficient. Notice that our CCE approach is consistent and has satisfactory fi-
nite sample performance even when there do not exist any or only small time-varying
decision-independent heterogeneity as shown in the previous sections. Thus, the differ-
ent estimated value based on the Within approach appears to reflect the fact that the
time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity have been ignored.
Finally, we further compare the pattern of cost efficiency of the savings and commer-
cial banks. Figure 1 plots the average cost efficiency of each group over the 1994-2007
period. Both the Within and CCE approaches exhibit an upward trend for the savings
and commercial banks, which implies that the banking industry operats more efficiently
under consolidation. This result may support the view that most U.S. banks have faced
increasing returns as recently discussed by Wheelock and Wilson (2012). However, the
pattern further shows that the difference between savings and commercial banks is rela-
tively small by using the Within approach rather than the CCE approach. As the figure
illustrates, savings banks are even more efficient than commercial banks based on the
Within estimation. As we discussed before, the efficiency may be affected by ignoring
the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity, which leads to bias in the estimated
efficiency.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many studies have revealed the importance of distinguishing fixed effects from inefficiency.
However, such research fails to consider the possibility that the specific heterogeneity can
have the time-varying property. In this paper, a stochastic frontier model with factor struc-
ture is developed to capture the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity which
is irrelevant to inefficiency and explain the cross-sectional dependence among individual
11This result is the same as that of Sun and Chang (2010), while it might arise due to endogeneity.
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firms. The novel feature of our model is that it distinguishes the time-varying “decision-
independent” heterogeneity and “technical inefficiency” according to a more fundamen-
tal definition of inefficiency mentioned by Koopmans (1951). The proposed maximum
likelihood method by model transformation does not require estimating unobserved time-
varying decision-independent heterogeneity. With the CCE transformation, we can control
the time-varying decision-independent heterogeneity and obtain consistent estimates of pa-
rameters for the panel stochastic frontier model. Our Monte Carlo simulations show that
the modified MLE has satisfactory finite sample properties under a significant degree of
cross-sectional dependence for relatively small T . The desirable results and computational
ease should appeal to empirical researchers.
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Table 1: Simulation results with cross-section dependence
T = 5 T = 10 T = 20
Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
N = 50 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.125 0.150 -0.002 0.058 2.596 0.146 0.159 0.000 0.021 7.695 0.155 0.162 0.000 0.012 13.170
δˆ1 -0.010 0.127 0.008 0.208 0.614 -0.002 0.080 -0.002 0.060 1.335 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.015 1.683
δˆ2 0.002 0.095 0.032 0.122 0.778 -0.002 0.021 0.001 0.013 1.565 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002 2.729
σˆ2v 0.166 0.202 -0.013 0.030 6.663 0.191 0.209 0.000 0.009 23.053 0.199 0.209 0.006 0.009 23.839
σˆ2u 0.049 0.239 0.039 0.279 0.856 0.031 0.159 0.007 0.116 1.372 0.006 0.086 -0.003 0.070 1.232
µˆ 0.068 0.263 0.014 0.285 0.924 0.020 0.208 -0.001 0.154 1.347 -0.007 0.137 -0.002 0.113 1.221
Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
N = 100 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.129 0.155 0.000 0.040 3.921 0.147 0.159 0.000 0.014 11.573 0.154 0.161 0.000 0.008 19.771
δˆ1 -0.027 0.109 -0.005 0.147 0.739 -0.002 0.071 0.001 0.039 1.800 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.010 2.203
δˆ2 -0.006 0.086 0.020 0.095 0.903 -0.002 0.019 0.000 0.010 1.906 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 3.499
σˆ2v 0.177 0.214 -0.009 0.022 9.859 0.194 0.211 0.000 0.006 33.560 0.201 0.210 0.003 0.005 40.385
σˆ2u 0.060 0.218 0.059 0.256 0.853 0.019 0.111 0.003 0.073 1.514 0.005 0.069 -0.003 0.051 1.348
µˆ 0.096 0.231 -0.004 0.240 0.963 0.026 0.173 0.004 0.106 1.642 -0.003 0.111 -0.001 0.079 1.412
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(continued)
T = 5 T = 10 T = 20
Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
N = 200 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.131 0.153 0.001 0.028 5.409 0.147 0.159 0.000 0.010 16.189 0.154 0.160 0.000 0.006 28.865
δˆ1 -0.026 0.094 -0.007 0.105 0.903 0.004 0.062 0.001 0.030 2.100 0.002 0.023 0.000 0.007 3.260
δˆ2 -0.006 0.078 0.010 0.078 0.998 -0.003 0.018 0.000 0.007 2.478 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 4.584
σˆ2v 0.179 0.212 -0.005 0.015 13.772 0.195 0.212 0.000 0.004 48.627 0.200 0.209 0.002 0.003 63.266
σˆ2u 0.051 0.185 0.061 0.216 0.853 0.015 0.093 0.003 0.055 1.708 0.002 0.056 -0.002 0.036 1.548
µˆ 0.087 0.202 -0.015 0.196 1.027 0.009 0.147 -0.003 0.076 1.944 -0.003 0.093 0.001 0.057 1.630
Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
N = 400 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.126 0.148 0.000 0.019 7.817 0.147 0.158 0.000 0.007 23.143 0.155 0.161 0.000 0.004 40.098
δˆ1 -0.026 0.085 -0.003 0.082 1.036 0.000 0.059 0.001 0.021 2.794 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.005 4.404
δˆ2 -0.005 0.076 0.010 0.073 1.032 -0.002 0.017 0.000 0.006 3.025 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 5.839
σˆ2v 0.173 0.205 -0.004 0.011 18.678 0.194 0.211 0.000 0.003 67.751 0.202 0.210 0.001 0.002 105.087
σˆ2u 0.044 0.152 0.043 0.175 0.868 0.011 0.084 0.000 0.036 2.319 0.002 0.050 -0.002 0.026 1.895
µˆ 0.082 0.180 -0.028 0.159 1.131 0.015 0.132 -0.005 0.052 2.521 0.006 0.080 0.002 0.043 1.849
1 In brief, we denote Within as the abbreviation of the within-transformation and CCE as the abbreviation for the proposed transformation.
2 ψ is the ratio of RMSE(Within)/RMSE(CCE).
3 The true values of the parameter set are β = 0.5, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.1, σ2v = 0.1, σ
2
u = 0.2, and µ = 0.5.
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Table 2: Simulation results with cross-section dependence under different σf
(T=10) σ2f = 0(only fixed effects) σ
2
f = 0.1 σ
2
f = 1
N = 50 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.020 0.776 0.087 0.097 -0.001 0.020 4.963 0.433 0.446 -0.000 0.019 24.016
δˆ1 0.001 0.031 0.004 0.066 0.478 0.001 0.075 0.006 0.077 0.971 0.014 0.126 0.002 0.074 1.694
δˆ2 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.016 0.446 0.001 0.200 -0.003 0.232 0.862 0.015 0.280 0.004 0.216 1.299
σˆ2v 0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.763 0.109 0.119 -0.001 0.009 13.655 0.592 0.604 -0.001 0.009 67.373
σˆ2u 0.012 0.103 0.012 0.129 0.801 0.017 0.152 0.009 0.151 1.008 0.077 0.258 0.017 0.158 1.629
µˆ -0.020 0.150 -0.009 0.172 0.870 0.007 0.182 0.010 0.181 1.006 -0.038 0.226 -0.003 0.177 1.272
N = 100 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.781 0.089 0.098 -0.000 0.014 7.041 0.427 0.439 -0.001 0.014 31.009
δˆ1 -0.001 0.022 0.005 0.049 0.458 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.050 1.037 0.002 0.096 -0.001 0.051 1.871
δˆ2 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.012 0.420 0.009 0.130 0.001 0.162 0.805 0.002 0.182 0.004 0.162 1.125
σˆ2v 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.816 0.112 0.123 -0.000 0.006 19.624 0.596 0.607 -0.000 0.006 98.686
σˆ2u 0.003 0.064 0.000 0.081 0.786 0.009 0.103 0.009 0.105 0.982 0.082 0.229 0.011 0.107 2.143
µˆ 0.001 0.092 0.001 0.111 0.833 -0.009 0.128 -0.001 0.125 1.026 -0.040 0.192 -0.004 0.136 1.412
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(continued)
(T=10) σ2f = 0(only fixed effects) σ
2
f = 0.1 σ
2
f = 1
N = 200 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.010 0.789 0.089 0.096 -0.000 0.009 10.234 0.430 0.441 0.000 0.010 45.506
δˆ1 0.000 0.015 -0.001 0.035 0.430 0.002 0.037 0.001 0.037 0.995 0.001 0.068 -0.002 0.037 1.845
δˆ2 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.353 0.003 0.094 0.008 0.114 0.824 -0.007 0.133 -0.003 0.115 1.154
σˆ2v 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.765 0.111 0.121 0.000 0.004 28.167 0.597 0.608 -0.000 0.004 135.998
σˆ2u 0.002 0.043 0.004 0.059 0.736 0.005 0.068 0.002 0.070 0.978 0.083 0.195 0.009 0.076 2.560
µˆ -0.001 0.064 0.001 0.081 0.801 -0.008 0.088 -0.003 0.089 0.987 -0.060 0.152 0.003 0.087 1.754
N = 400 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.803 0.088 0.094 -0.000 0.007 13.411 0.426 0.438 0.000 0.007 65.428
δˆ1 -0.001 0.011 0.001 0.026 0.416 0.003 0.026 0.001 0.024 1.068 -0.003 0.049 0.002 0.025 1.980
δˆ2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.283 0.002 0.067 -0.000 0.079 0.843 -0.007 0.094 0.004 0.077 1.229
σˆ2v 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.808 0.109 0.119 -0.000 0.003 38.680 0.594 0.606 -0.000 0.003 193.373
σˆ2u 0.001 0.032 -0.001 0.042 0.755 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.043 1.124 0.086 0.178 0.003 0.046 3.831
µˆ 0.001 0.043 0.000 0.056 0.761 -0.009 0.062 -0.002 0.063 0.986 -0.060 0.119 -0.008 0.060 1.963
1 ψ is the ratio of RMSE(Within)/RMSE(CCE).
2 The true values of the parameter set are β = 0.5, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.5, σ2v = 0.1, σ
2
u = 0.2, and µ = 0.5.
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Table 3: Simulation results with cross-section dependence under different σf
(T=20) σ2f = 0(only fixed effects) σ
2
f = 0.1 σ
2
f = 1
N = 50 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.912 0.089 0.094 0.000 0.011 8.272 0.447 0.453 0.000 0.012 38.062
δˆ1 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.014 0.466 -0.002 0.044 -0.003 0.035 1.257 -0.000 0.089 -0.002 0.038 2.332
δˆ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.759 0.000 0.171 -0.002 0.194 0.885 0.002 0.209 -0.006 0.193 1.084
σˆ2v 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.923 0.110 0.116 -0.000 0.005 22.063 0.626 0.631 -0.000 0.005 122.391
σˆ2u 0.006 0.079 0.004 0.080 0.988 0.010 0.110 -0.001 0.101 1.096 0.054 0.207 -0.000 0.102 2.030
µˆ -0.015 0.122 -0.014 0.124 0.988 0.001 0.141 0.015 0.130 1.080 -0.013 0.171 0.011 0.131 1.310
N = 100 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.909 0.089 0.093 0.000 0.008 11.114 0.443 0.448 0.000 0.008 53.979
δˆ1 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.437 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.025 1.299 0.000 0.062 0.001 0.025 2.512
δˆ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.778 0.002 0.118 -0.003 0.135 0.875 -0.008 0.140 -0.006 0.133 1.055
σˆ2v 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.908 0.110 0.116 -0.000 0.004 31.880 0.629 0.635 -0.000 0.004 169.412
σˆ2u 0.003 0.053 0.003 0.054 0.973 0.003 0.078 -0.002 0.069 1.127 0.041 0.148 -0.002 0.069 2.133
µˆ -0.009 0.082 -0.008 0.085 0.974 -0.004 0.094 0.003 0.091 1.037 -0.018 0.125 0.004 0.087 1.428
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(continued)
(T=20) σ2f = 0(only fixed effects) σ
2
f = 0.1 σ
2
f = 1
N = 200 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.906 0.088 0.092 -0.000 0.006 16.425 0.442 0.447 -0.000 0.006 77.077
δˆ1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.437 -0.000 0.023 -0.000 0.017 1.314 -0.001 0.044 -0.000 0.017 2.558
δˆ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.681 0.003 0.085 0.004 0.090 0.940 -0.003 0.101 -0.001 0.094 1.081
σˆ2v 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.902 0.110 0.115 -0.000 0.003 44.603 0.631 0.636 0.000 0.003 244.367
σˆ2u 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.037 0.966 0.005 0.052 -0.001 0.045 1.165 0.040 0.116 0.000 0.049 2.383
µˆ -0.003 0.053 -0.003 0.054 0.977 -0.008 0.057 -0.001 0.053 1.067 -0.028 0.087 0.002 0.053 1.644
N = 400 Within CCE Within CCE Within CCE
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.906 0.088 0.091 -0.000 0.004 22.551 0.444 0.449 -0.000 0.004 107.029
δˆ1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.441 0.001 0.015 -0.000 0.012 1.291 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.013 2.374
δˆ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.593 0.007 0.059 0.004 0.065 0.919 -0.003 0.075 -0.002 0.066 1.126
σˆ2v 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.911 0.109 0.114 -0.000 0.002 62.508 0.635 0.639 0.000 0.002 354.291
σˆ2u 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.026 0.956 0.002 0.035 0.001 0.032 1.097 0.031 0.082 0.001 0.033 2.524
µˆ -0.002 0.040 -0.002 0.040 0.978 -0.010 0.040 -0.002 0.035 1.140 -0.031 0.067 -0.002 0.037 1.815
1 ψ is the ratio of RMSE(Within)/RMSE(CCE).
2 The true values of the parameter set are β = 0.5, δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.5, σ2v = 0.1, σ
2
u = 0.2, and µ = 0.5.
3 The bias is defined by (Estimated value− True Value).
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Table 4: Simulation results: x and z are affected by an
unobservable common shock (T=20).
Within CCE
N = 50 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.292 0.534 0.000 0.012 45.393
δˆ1 -0.139 0.431 0.001 0.066 6.514
δˆ2 0.102 0.373 0.001 0.037 10.198
σˆ2v 1.507 9.953 -0.001 0.005 1837.170
σˆ2u 34721.845 68882.385 1.412 13.975 4928.831
µˆ 0.038 0.225 0.036 0.234 0.959
Within CCE
N = 100 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.272 0.446 0.000 0.008 54.281
δˆ1 -0.140 0.342 0.001 0.054 6.370
δˆ2 0.089 0.304 0.000 0.028 10.693
σˆ2v 0.917 3.523 -0.001 0.004 968.563
σˆ2u 39725.677 76044.209 0.180 0.866 87785.493
µˆ 0.054 0.214 0.008 0.174 1.227
Within CCE
N = 200 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.287 0.486 -0.000 0.006 85.221
δˆ1 -0.124 0.372 0.003 0.039 9.653
δˆ2 0.093 0.288 -0.001 0.020 14.582
σˆ2v 1.135 5.096 -0.000 0.003 2004.083
σˆ2u 32871.244 65416.402 0.078 0.444 147318.408
µˆ 0.039 0.213 -0.011 0.106 2.004
Within CCE
N = 400 Bias RMSE Bias RMSE ψ
βˆ 0.249 0.390 -0.000 0.004 95.194
δˆ1 -0.136 0.349 -0.000 0.027 12.743
δˆ2 0.098 0.230 0.000 0.014 16.608
σˆ2v 0.856 2.493 -0.000 0.002 1348.341
σˆ2u 40286.341 76224.203 0.050 0.319 238843.857
µˆ 0.048 0.213 -0.007 0.050 4.282
1 ψ is the ratio of RMSE(Within)/RMSE(CCE).
2 The true values of the parameter set are β = 0.5, δ1 = 0.2, δ2 =
−0.1, σ2v = 0.1, σ
2
u = 0.4, and µ = 0.5.
3 The bias is defined by (Estimated value −True Value).
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Table 5: Statistics of variables used in the cost function
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Cost 1.11×103 4.60×103 4.10 8.08×104
Output quantities
Total loans 1.06×104 4.29×104 42.60 6.77×105
Other earning assets 5.77×103 3.30×104 0.50 6.92×105
Total deposits 1.20×104 5.21×104 1.80 7.94×105
Liquid assets 3.28×103 2.59×104 0.10 6.48×106
Input prices
Price of capital 0.04 0.05 1.99×10−3 1.24
Price of funds 5.29 1.48×103 0.34 7.56×104
Other variables’ quantity and ratios
Total assets 1.86×104 8.31×104 62.00 1.32×106
Return on average assets 1.32 1.20 -3.18 24.04
Equity to assets 9.77 5.39 4 82.36
1 The variables in total cost and output quantities are measured in U.S. $ millions.
2 There are a total of 3,122 bank-year observations.
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Table 6: Estimation results of the cost frontier
Within CCE
Exp. Sign θˆ Std. Dev. θˆ Std. Dev.
Effects on cost function
ln(PC/PF) (+) 0.371 ∗∗∗ 0.018 0.184 ∗∗∗ 0.006
ln(TL) (+) 0.033 ∗ 0.019 0.216 ∗∗∗ 0.015
ln(OEA) (+) 0.002 0.018 -0.012 ∗∗ 0.005
ln(TD) (+) 0.696 ∗∗∗ 0.020 0.861 ∗∗∗ 0.014
ln(LA) (+) 0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.018 0.027 ∗∗∗ 0.003
Effects on inefficiency
ln(TA) (?) -0.347 ∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.202 ∗∗∗ 0.018
ETA (+) -0.166 ∗∗ 0.018 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.010
ROAA (-) 0.470 ∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.002
TYPE (-) 0.117 ∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.263 ∗∗∗ 0.085
σ2v 0.153 0.004
σ2u 518.796 38.127
1 ∗ Significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level and ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%
level.
2 Exp. Sign explains the expected relationship between inefficiency and variables.
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Figure 1: Average Cost Efficiency in All Banks
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Appendix A-Useful Lemmas
Below we introduce some useful lemmas for proving the main results in our paper. The proof
can be founded in the Supplementary Material.
Assumption for Lemma 1:
(L1) Q0(θ) is three times continuously differentiable with its derivatives satisfying
√
NTS(θ0)
D−→ N(0, {E[−H(θ0)]}−1),
H(θ0) IP−→ E[H(θ0)],
max
j=1,...,d
sup
θ
|| ∂Q0(θ)
∂θ∂θ′∂θj
|| = Op(1),
where S(θ0) = ∂Q0(θ)∂θ |θ0 and H(θ0) = ∂Q0(θ)∂θ∂θ′ |θ0 .
Lemma 1. As assumption (L1) holds withΘ which is compact, and
√
NT supθ |Q˜NT (θ)−QNT (θ)| =
op(1) as N, T →∞. Then
√
NT (θ˜−θ0) D−→ N(0, {E[−H(θ0)]}−1), where θ˜ is obtained from max-
imizing the objective function Q˜NT (θ).
Throughout the following lemmas, we use the following notations: ξ¯ = (ξ¯1, ..., ξ¯T )
′, ξi = (ξi1, ..., ξiT )′,
vi = (vi1, ..., viT )
′, u¯ = (u¯1, ..., u¯T )′, ζ¯ = h¯0µ+0 − u¯, u¯i = T−1
∑T
t=1 uit, h¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 hit and
G = [ D F u¯ ]. Recall that H¯0 =
[
D, y¯, X¯, h¯0µ
+
0
]
, together with equation (9), H¯0 can be
rewritten as H¯0 =
[
GP¯+ ψ¯ + ξ¯∗
]
, where
P¯ =

1 B¯ 0
0 C¯ 0
0 e′(k+1)1 1
 , G = [ D F u¯ ]
and
ξ¯∗ =
[
0(T×1) ξ¯ 0(T×1)
]
, ψ¯ =
[
0(T×1) 0(T×(k+1)) ζ¯
]
,
and e(k+1)1 denotes a k+1 vector where the first element is -1/1 for production/cost function and
the others are zero.
Lemma 2. As assumptions 1–4 hold, we have
(B1) T−1ξ¯′ξ¯ = Op(N−1);
(B2) T−1ξ′iξ¯ = Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )−1/2);
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(B3) T−1D′ξ¯ = Op((NT )−1/2);
(B4) T−1F′ξ¯ = Op((NT )−1/2);
(B5) T−1D′vi = Op(T−1/2);
(B6) T−1F′vi = Op(T−1/2).
Lemma 3. As assumptions 1–4 hold, we have
(C1) T−1
(
u¯′ξ¯
)
= Op
(
(NT )−1/2
)
;
(C2) T−1
(
ξ¯′ζ¯
)
= OP (N
−1T−1/2);
(C3) T−1
(
G′ζ¯
)
= Op(N
−1/2);
(C4) T−1
(
ζ¯′ζ¯
)
= Op(N
−1);
(C5) T−1
(
ξiζ¯
)
= Op((NT )
−1/2);
(C6) T−1 (ξ′iG) = Op(T
−1/2);
(C7) T−1
(
(ui − u¯i)′ξ¯
)
= Op((NT )
−1/2);
(C8) T−1
(
(ui − u¯i)′ζ¯
)
= Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )−1/2);
(C9) T−1 ((ui − u¯i)′G) = Op(N−1) +Op(T−1/2);
(C10) T−1(hi − h¯i)′N−1
∑N
j=1 hju
∗
j = Op(N
−1) +Op(T−1/2).
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Appendix B-Proof of Main Propositions and Theorems
Recall the transformed log-likelihood functions of (12) and (13),
QNT (θ) = (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(T − s) (ln (2π) + lnσ2v)− 12(yi −Xiβ − F0λi,0)′ ×
M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ − F0λi,0) +1
2
(
µ2c
σ2∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)
+ ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µc
σ∗
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))}
,
(12)
and
Q˜NT (θ) = (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(T − s) (ln (2π) + lnσ2v)− 12(yi −Xiβ)′ ×
M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ) +1
2
(
µ2∗
σ2∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)
+ ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))}
.
(13)
Proof of Proposition 1. To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we separate (13) into five parts:
P1 = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(T − s) (ln(2π) + lnσ2v)} ,
P2 = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(yi −Xiβ)′M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ)
}
,
P3 = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
1
2
(
µ2∗
σ2∗
− µ
2
σ2u
)}
,
P4 = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
ln
(
σ∗Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
))}
,
P5 = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))}
.
Since P1 and P5 are the same as part of (12), we only need to investigate the differences of P2,
P3 and P4 between (12) and (13).
Consider P2. By the facts that yi = Dαi+Xiβ+Fλi+εi, M¯Dαi = 0 and M¯Π
−M¯ = σ−2v M¯,
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P2 can be rewritten as,
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(yi −Xiβ)′M¯Π−M¯(yi −Xiβ)
}
= σ−2v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(yi −Xiβ)′M¯(yi −Xiβ)
}
= σ−2v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(F0λi0 + εi +Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯ (F0λi0 + εi +Xi(β0 − β))
}
= σ−2v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
{
−1
2
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯ (Xi(β0 − β))
}
− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
{
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯F0λi0
}− σ−2v (NT )−1 N∑
i=1
{
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯εi
}
− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
ε′iM¯F0λi0 − σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
1
2
λ′i0F
′
0M¯F0λi0 − σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
1
2
ε′iM¯εi
=: A1(θ) +A2(θ) +A3(θ) +A4(θ) +A5(θ) +A6(θ).
Particularly, A1(θ), A3(θ) and A6(θ) do not affected by the factor structure, therefore we will
focus on the properties of A2(θ), A4(θ) and A5(θ) respectively. For A2(θ),
A2(θ) =− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯F0λi0
=− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯F0(λ¯ − η¯)− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯F0ηi0
=− σ−2v T−1(β0 − β)′X¯′M¯F0(λ¯− η¯)− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯F0ηi0
=0− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯0F0ηi0 − σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′F0ηi0κNT
= : A2,1(θ) +A2,2(θ).
Since λi0 = η + ηi0, after taking cross-sectional average of λi0, we have λ¯ = η + η¯. The second
equality holds by replacing λi0 by λ¯ − η¯ + ηi0. The fourth equality holds because M¯X¯ = 0 and
M¯ = M¯0 + κNT , where κNT = O(bNT ) by θ ∈ B. Note that for easy to state, we use A2,1(θ) and
A2,2(θ) to denote the rest of terms we need to discuss.
Consider A2,1(θ), because of the fact that F0 = −(ξ¯ + U¯)C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1 from equation (10) and
U¯ = (U¯1, ..., U¯T )
′, we have
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A2,1(θ) =σ
−2
v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯0(ξ¯ + U¯)C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0
=σ−2v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯0ξ¯C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0
+ σ−2v (NT )
−1
N∑
i=1
(Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯0U¯C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0.
The property of the first term can be obtained from the fact that C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1 is bounded and
the result that
(β0−β)′X′iM¯0
√
N ξ¯√
T
= OP (1) proved by Pesaran (2006). Therefore, with ηi0 which is
distributed independently of Xi, ξ¯ and elements in M¯0, we have
N−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′X′iM¯0
√
N ξ¯√
T
C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0 = Op(N−1/2),
that is σ−2v (NT )
−1∑N
i=1 (Xi(β0 − β))′ M¯0ξ¯C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0 = Op(N−1T−1/2). We can prove the
second term in A2,1(θ) in the similar way because M¯0U¯ = M¯0(U¯− [h¯0µ+0 ,0]) = [M¯0ζ¯,0], and
N−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′X′iM¯0
√
N ζ¯√
T
C¯′(C¯C¯′)−1ηi0 = Op(N−1/2).
Thus, we have A2,1(θ) = Op(N
−1T−1/2).
Next, consider A2,2(θ). We have
A2,2(θ) = −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′X′iF0ηi0κNT
= −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′(F0τi0 + ei)′F0ηi0κNT
= −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′τ ′i0F′0F0ηi0κNT − σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(β0 − β)′e′iF0ηi0κNT ,
where the first equality comes from facts that Xi = DA
′
i + Fτi + ei and DA
′
i has been re-
moved by M¯. The first term of the last equation can be rearranged as −σ−2v (N)−1
∑N
i=1(β0 −
β)′τ ′i0
F
′
0
F0
T ηi0κNT . Since
F
′
0
F0
T = Op(1) and ηi0 is distributed independently of τi0 and F0,
we have −σ−2v (NT )−1
∑N
i=1(β0 − β)′τ ′i0F′0F0ηi0κNT = Op(N−1/2bNT ). Further, according to
the result of
e′iF0
T = Op(T
−1/2) and the property of ηi0 we used before. We can show that
−σ−2v (NT )−1
∑N
i=1(β0 − β)′e′iF0ηi0κNT = Op((NT )−1/2bNT ). Combining these results, we have
A2,2(θ) = Op(N
−1/2bNT ). Therefore, A2(θ) = OP (N−1T−1/2) +Op(N−1/2bNT ).
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For A4(θ), using the same fact that λi0 = λ¯− η¯ + ηi0, we have
A4(θ) = −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
ε′iM¯F0λi0
= −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
ε′iM¯F0(λ¯ − η¯)− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
ε′iM¯F0ηi0
= −σ−2v T−1ε¯′M¯F0(λ¯− η¯)− σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
ε′iM¯F0ηi0
=: A4,1(θ) +A4,2(θ).
In particular,
A4,1(θ) = −σ−2v T−1ε¯′M¯0F0(λ¯− η¯)− σ−2v T−1ε¯′F0(λ¯ − η¯)κNT
= −σ−2v T−1(v¯ + (u¯ − h¯0µ+0 ))′M¯0F0(λ¯− η¯)− σ−2v T−1(v¯ + u¯)′F0(λ¯− η¯)κNT .
We can rewrite the first term of the above equation as
− σ−2v T−1(v¯ + (u¯ − h¯0µ+0 ))′M¯0F0(λ¯− η¯)
= −σ−2v T−1v¯′M¯0F0(λ¯− η¯)− σ−2v T−1(u¯− h¯0µ+0 )′M¯0F0(λ¯− η¯).
Using the fact 1T v¯
′M¯0F0 = 1T v¯
′F0 − 1T v¯H¯0(H¯0H¯′0)−1H¯′0F0 and the results from lemmas (B1),
(B3), (B4), (C1)-(C4) and the fact v¯ = Op(N
−1/2), we have
1
T
v¯′H¯0(H¯0H¯
′
0)
−1H¯′0F0 =
v¯′H¯0
T
(
H¯0H¯
′
0
T
)−1
H¯′0F0
T
=


v¯′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1/2)
+
v¯′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)



P¯
′
G′G
T
P¯+ P¯′
G′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1/2)
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)


−1
×

P¯
′
G′F0
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′F0
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op((NT )−1/2)


= =
v¯′G
T
P¯
(
P¯′
G′G
T
P¯
)
−1
P¯′
G′F0
T
+Op(N
−1).
Notice that we keep the first term of the above equation to illustrate the fact that 1T v¯
′F0 −
v¯′G
T P¯
(
P¯′G
′
G
T P¯
)−1
P¯′G
′
F0
T =
1
T v¯
′M¯GF0 = 0 because F0 ∈ G. Combining these results, we
have 1T v¯
′M¯0F0 = Op(N−1). In the same manner, we have 1T (u¯ − h¯0µ+0 )′M¯0F0 = Op(N−1).
In addition, the term, σ−2v T
−1(v¯ + u¯)′F0(λ¯ − η¯)κNT is needed to investigate. The property of
this term can be obtained by using 1T v¯
′F0 = Op((NT )−1/2) and 1T u¯
′F0 = Op(T−1/2). Thus,
σ−2v T
−1(v¯+ u¯)′F0(λ¯− η¯)κNT = Op(T−1/2bNT ). These give A4,1(θ) = Op(N−1)+Op(T−1/2bNT ).
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Next, consider A4,2(θ),
A4,2(θ) = −σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(εi − ε¯i)′M¯0F0ηi0 − σ−2v (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
(εi − ε¯i)′F0ηi0κNT .
The first term of A4,2(θ) can be decomposed into
1
T (εi − ε¯i)′M¯0F0 = 1T (εi − ε¯i)′F0 − 1T (εi −
ε¯i)
′H¯0(H¯0H¯′0)
−1H¯′0F0 and using lemmas (B2), (C5) and (C7)-(C8), with
1
T (εi−ε¯i)′G = Op(N−1)+
Op(T
−1/2) by lemmas (C6) and (C9), we have
1
T
(εi − ε¯i)
′H¯0(H¯0H¯
′
0)
−1H¯′0F0
=


(εi − ε¯i)′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)+Op(T−1/2)
+
(εi − ε¯i)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)+Op((NT )−1/2)



P¯
′
G′G
T
P¯+ P¯′
G′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1/2)
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)


−1
×

P¯
′
G′F0
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′F0
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op((NT )−1/2)


=
(εi − ε¯i)
′G
T
P¯
(
P¯′
G′G
T
P¯
)
−1
P¯′
G′F0
T
+ Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )
−1/2).
Similarly, we keep the first interaction term, together with 1T (εi − ε¯i)′F0, then we have 1T (εi −
ε¯i)
′F0 − (εi−ε¯i)
′
G
T P¯
(
P¯′G
′
G
T P¯
)−1
P¯′G
′
F0
T =
1
T (εi − ε¯i)′M¯GF0 = 0. Thus, 1T (εi − ε¯i)′M¯0F0 =
Op(N
−1) + Op((NT )−1/2). Since ηi0 is distributed independently of F0, vi and ui, we can con-
clude that −σ−2v (NT )−1
∑N
i=1(εi − ε¯i)′M¯0F0ηi0 = Op(N−3/2) + Op(N−1T−1/2). Finally, since
1
T v
′
iF0 =
1
T (ui − u¯i)′F0 = Op(T−1/2), we therefore have −σ−2v (NT )−1
∑N
i=1(εi − ε¯i)′F0ηi0κNT =
Op((NT )
−1/2bNT ). Taking these results from A4,1(θ) and A4,2(θ), we have A4(θ) = Op(N−1) +
Op(N
−1T−1/2) +Op((NT )−1/2bNT ).
Now, consider A5(θ). By using the following inequality
‖ 1
T
λ′i0F
′
0M¯F0λi0‖ = ‖
1
T
λ′i0F
′
0M¯M¯F0λi0‖ ≤
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖M¯F0λi0(t)‖2,
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where M¯F0λi0(t) denotes the t−th element of M¯F0λi0. Since
λ′i0F
′
0M¯ = λ
′
i0F
′
0κNT + λ
′
i0F
′
0 − λ
′
i0F
′
0H¯0(H¯0H¯
′
0)
−1H¯′0
= λ′i0F
′
0κNT + λ
′
i0F
′
0 − λ
′
i0


F′0G
T
P¯+
F′0(ξ¯
∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op((NT )−1/2)



P¯
′
G′G
T
P¯+ P¯′
G′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1/2)
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)


−1
×

P¯′G′ + (ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (N
−1/2)


= λ′i0F
′
0κNT + λ
′
i0F
′
0 − λ
′
i0
F′0G
T
P¯
(
P¯′
G′G
T
P¯
)
−1
P¯′G′ + Op(N
−1/2)
= λ′i0F
′
0κNT + λ
′
i0F
′
0M¯G + Op(N
−1/2)
= Op(bNT ) + Op(N
−1/2),
we have 1T
∑T
t=1 ‖M¯F0λi0(t)‖2 = Op(b2NT ) +Op(N−1) +Op(N−1/2bNT ) and A5(θ) = Op(b2NT ) +
Op(N
−1) + Op(N−1/2bNT ). Combining the above results of A2(θ), A4(θ) and A5(θ), we have
P2 = Op(N
−1) +Op(N−1/2bNT ) +Op(b2NT ).
So far, we still need to examine P3 and P4. First, we define
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
lnΦ
(
µc
σ∗
)
=: (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
f
(
µc
σ∗
)
,
and by the first order of Taylor expansion at µ∗σ∗ , we have
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
f
(
µc
σ∗
)
≈ (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
[
f
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
+ f ′
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
(hi − h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v(
h′iM¯hi/σ2v + 1/σ2u
)1/2
]
,
where h¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 hit. Rewrite the second term in the brackets of right hand side as
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
[
f ′
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
(hi − h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v(
h′iM¯hi/σ2v + 1/σ2u
)1/2
]
=N−1T−1/2
N∑
i=1
f ′
(
µ∗
σ∗
)(
h′iM¯hi/σ
2
v + 1/σ
2
u
T
)−1/2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(1)
(
(hi − h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v
T
) .
Here,
(hi − h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v
T
=
(hi − h¯i)′M¯0Fλi/σ2v
T
+
(hi − h¯i)′Fλi/σ2v
T
× κNT .
The first term can be decomposed into 1T (hi−h¯i)′M¯0Fλi/σ2v = 1T (hi−h¯i)′F0− 1T (hi−h¯i)′H¯0(H¯0H¯′0)−1H¯′0F0.
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We use the results similar to Lemmas (C7)-(C8) and obtain
1
T
(hi − h¯i)
′H¯0(H¯0H¯
′
0)
−1H¯′0F0
=


(hi − h¯i)′G
T
P¯+
(hi − h¯i)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)+Op((NT )−1/2)



P¯
′
G′G
T
P¯+ P¯′
G′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′G
T
P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (N
−1/2)
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op(N−1)


−1
×

P¯
′
G′F0
T
+
(ξ¯∗ + ψ¯)′F0
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP ((NT )
−1/2)

 .
Notice that 1T (hi−h¯i)′G = Op(N−1)+Op(T−1/2) because of lemma (C10) and a similar argument
of (C9), thus
1
T
(hi − h¯i)′H¯0(H¯0H¯′0)−1H¯′0F0 =
(hi − h¯i)′G
T
P¯
(
P¯′
G′G
T
P¯
)−1
P¯′
G′F0
T
+Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )−1/2).
Further, together with a similar argument of (C9), the second term
(hi−h¯i)′Fλi/σ2v
T × κNT =
Op(T
−1/2bNT ). Thus
(hi − h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v
T
= Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )−1/2) +Op(T−1/2bNT ).
Using this result, the term f ′
(
µ∗
σ∗
)(
h′iM¯hi/σ
2
v+1/σ
2
u
T
)−1/2 (
(hi−h¯i)′M¯Fλi/σ2v
T
)
should be Op(N
−1)+
Op((NT )
−1/2) +Op(T−1/2bNT ). It implies that the difference between (NT )−1
∑N
i=1 f
(
µc
σ∗
)
and
(NT )−1
∑N
i=1 f
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
is Op(N
−1T−1/2) +Op(N−1/2T−1) +Op(T−1/2bNT ). The results of P3 and
P4 are readily obtained.
Taking results from P2, P3 and P4, we have
P2+P3+P4 = Op(N
−1)+Op(N−1/2T−1)+Op(T−1/2bNT )+Op(N−1/2bNT )+Op(b2NT ). (M.1)
The first result of Proposition 1 can be proved because when bNT → 0, P2 + P3 + P4 IP−→ 0. The
second result about θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ can be proved by assuming bNT does not converge to zero. In this
case, it implies that the difference of P2+P3+P4 will be dominated by the term Op(b
2
NT ) which
comes from the quadratic term of A4(θ). Thus the difference between QNT (θ0) and Q˜NT (θ) is
greater than zero in probability one when θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ.
Proof of Theorem 1. For any ǫ > 0, we have (a) Q˜NT (θ˜) > Q˜NT (θ0) − ǫ3 ; (b) Q˜NT (θ0) >
Q0(θ0)− ǫ3 and (c) Q˜0(θ) > Q˜NT (θ)− ǫ3 . (a) holds because θ˜ maximizes Q˜NT , (b) holds because
45
the result 1 from Proposition 1 by letting θ = θ0, and (c) holds because Assumption 5 (iv).
Therefore, we have
Q˜0(θ˜) > Q˜NT (θ˜)− ǫ
3
> Q˜NT (θ0)− 2ǫ
3
> Q0(θ0)− ǫ.
Using the same definitions of bNT and B, we have QNT (θ0) − Q˜NT (θ) > 0 with probability 1 for
all θ ∈ Bc ∩Θ from the first result of Proposition 1. Taking this result with conditions (iii) and
(iv) of Assumption 5, for any given ǫ > 0, there is a constant K > 0 such that
P[|Q0(θ0)− Q˜0(θ) > K] ≥ 1− ǫ,
for all θ ∈ Bc ∩ Θ. Also Q0(θ0) = Q˜0(θ0) if and only if Q0 = Q˜0 and Q0(θ0) > Q˜0(θ) for
all θ ∈ Bc ∩ Θ. Therefore, by Bc ∩ Θ is compact, θ0 maximizes Q0(θ) and (i) of Assumption
5, supθ∈Bc∩Θ Q˜0(θ) = Q0(θ
∗) < Q0(θ0) for some θ∗ ∈ Bc ∩ Θ. Thus, choosing ǫ = Q0(θ0) −
supθ∈Bc∩Θ Q˜0(θ), it follows that
Q˜0(θ˜) > sup
θ∈Bc∩Θ
Q˜0(θ).
with probability one, and hence θ˜ ∈ B.
Proof of Proposition 2. It can be proved immediately by multiplying
√
NT and equation (M.1)
from Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since the result from Proposition 2 satisfies the requirement of Lemma 1,
we can prove the asymptotic normality of our proposed estimator immediately.
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Supplementary Material
Proof of Lemma 1. See Theorem A.5 of Kristensen and Shin (2012).
Proof of Lemma 2. It can be shown based on Lemma 2 of Pesaran (2006).
Through out these proofs, we useK to denote a positive number which is bounded and subscript
“0” to denote the parameter which is evaluated at the true value.
Proof of Lemma (C1). Let ξ¯l = (ξ¯1,l, ξ¯2,l, ..., ξ¯T,l)
′ denotes the l-th element of ξ¯. Since hit,0,
u∗i , vit and eit are mutually independent and note that E(hit,0) < K and E(u
∗
i ) < K, ∀i, j. We
have
E
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
h′i,0u
∗
i ξ¯l
)
= 0 (S.1)
and
E(u¯2t ) = E
(N−1 N∑
i=1
hit,0u
∗
i
)2
= N−2E
 N∑
i=1
h2it,0u
∗2
i +
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
hit,0hjt,0u
∗
i u
∗
j

= N−2
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E(u
∗2
i ) +N
−2
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
E(hit,0)E(hjt,0)E(u
∗
i )E(u
∗
j ) = O(1).
Thus,
Var
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
h′i,0u
∗
i ξ¯l
)
= Var
(
T∑
t=1
u¯tξ¯t,l
)
=
T∑
t=1
Var
(
u¯tξ¯t,l
)
=
T∑
t=1
E(u¯2t )E(ξ¯
2
t,l) = O
(
TN−1
)
, (S.2)
the second equality comes from the fact,
Cov
(
u¯tξ¯t,l, u¯sξ¯s,l
)
= E
(
u¯tξ¯t,lu¯sξ¯s,l
)− E (u¯tξ¯t,l)E (u¯sξ¯s,l)
=E
(
ξ¯t,l
)
E
(
ξ¯s,l
)
E (u¯tu¯s)− E
(
ξ¯t,l
)
E (u¯t)E
(
ξ¯s,l
)
E (u¯s) = 0,
where the last equality holds by E(vitvis) = 0 and E(eite
′
is) = 0 for all i, j, and the last equality
of (S.2) holds by E(ξ¯2t,l) = O(N
−1). Together with (S.1) and (S.2), we obtain
Var
(
T−1u¯′ξ¯
)
= O
(
(NT )−1
)
,
hence, T−1u¯′ξ¯ = Op
(
(NT )−1/2
)
.
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Proof of Lemma (C2). Recall that ζ¯ = h¯0µ
+
0 − u¯, the mean of ξ¯tu¯t is equal to 0 for all t by
the fact that hit,0, u
∗
i , vit and eit are mutually independent. Furthermore,
Var
[
(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
ξ¯t
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
= (NT )−2
T∑
t=1
E
(
ξ¯tξ¯
′
t
)
E
( N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
= (NT )−2
T∑
t=1
E
(
ξ¯tξ¯
′
t
) N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E
[
(µ+0 − u∗i )2
]
,
in particular, the second and third equalities hold by E(ξ¯tξ¯
′
s) = 0 ∀t 6= s and E[(µ+0 − u∗i )(µ+0 −
u∗j)] = 0 ∀i 6= j, respectively. Moreover,E(h2it,0) < K, E
[
(µ+0 − u∗i )2
]
< K and
(
ξ¯tξ¯
′
t
)
= Op(N
−1),
thus,
Var
[
(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
ξ¯t
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
= O(N−2T−1).
We therefore have (NT )−1
∑T
t=1 ξ¯t
∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i ) = Op(N−1T−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C3). Recall G = [ D F u¯ ], we prove (C3) for each element of G, first,
we turn our focus on (NT )−1
∑T
t=1Dt
∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i ). Notice that the mean is equal to 0 by
u∗i and hit,0 are mutually independent, and
Var
[
(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
Dt
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
=(NT )−2E
[
T∑
t=1
Dt
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]2
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
D2t
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
DtDs
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
) N∑
j=1
hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
 .
The first term can be written as
E
(NT )−2 T∑
t=1
D2t
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
=(NT )−2
T∑
t=1
D2t
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E
[
(µ+0 − u∗i )2
]
=O((NT )−1), (S.3)
where the second equality comes from the fact that E[(µ+0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j )] = 0 ∀i 6= j, and u∗i
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is independent of hjt,0 for all i, j. The last equality holds by E(h
2
it,0) < K, E
[
(µ+0 − u∗i )2
]
< K.
The second term,
E
(NT )−2 T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
DtDs
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
) N∑
j=1
hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )

=(NT )−2
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
DtDs
N∑
i=1
E(hit,0his,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2 = O(N−1), (S.4)
the second equality holds for the same reason that E[(µ+0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j )] = 0, and the desired
result can be obtained with the assumption of finite first moment of hit,0. To sum up (S.3) and
(S.4), we obtain
Var
(
(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
Dt
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)
= O(N−1),
and which implies (NT )−1
∑T
t=1Dt
∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i ) = Op(N−1/2).
Next, consider the l-th row of T−1
[
F′N−1
∑N
i=1 hi,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
, which can be written as
T−1[
∑T
t=1 fltN
−1∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 −u∗i )]. Notice that its mean is equal to 0 by the similar argument
in the previous case, and the variance,
Var
[
T−1
(
T∑
t=1
fltN
−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)]
=(NT )−2E
[
T∑
t=1
flt
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]2
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
f2lt
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
fltfls
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
) N∑
j=1
hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j)

=(NT )−2
[
T∑
t=1
E(f2lt)
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
E(fltfls)
(
N∑
i=1
E(hit,0his,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2
) ,
the third equality holds by E[(µ+0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j)] = 0. Furthermore, because F is covariance sta-
tionary process distributed independently of u∗i , the autocovariance function decays exponentially
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in |t− s|. By these assumptions,
Var
[
T−1
(
T∑
t=1
fltN
−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)]
=(NT )−2
[
T∑
t=1
E(f2lt)
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
Γfl(|t− s|)
(
N∑
i=1
E(hit,0his,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2
) = O((NT−1)),
where Γfl is the autocovariance function of flt, and the last equality holds by E(f
2
lt) < K,
E(h2it,0) < K, E(µ
+
0 −u∗i )2 < K andE(hit,0his,0) < K, which establishes T−1
[
F′N−1
∑N
i=1 hi,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
=
Op((NT )
−1/2).
Finally, we analyze the last term. Notice that
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j

=N−2T−1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )u∗i
=O(N−1), (S.5)
the first equality holds by the assumption that E[(µ+0 − u∗i )u∗j ] = 0, ∀i 6= j, and the last equality
is true by E(h2it,0) < K, and E(u
∗2
i ) < K. The variance,
Var
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j

=E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
2
−
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
2 ,
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where the first term can be rearranged as
T−2E
 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
2

+ T−2E
 T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j

×
N−1 N∑
j=1
hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j)
N−1 N∑
j=1
hjs,0u
∗
j

=:A1 +A2.
Consider A1,
A1 = N
−4T−2E
T∑
t=1
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
hit,0hjt,0hkt,0hlt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j)u∗ku∗l
 ,
in which expectation is non-zero only in the following three cases: (i) i = j = k = l, (ii) i = j and
j = l, and (iii) i = l and j = k by assuming that the forth moment of hit,0 exists. It follows that
A1 =N
−4T−2E
T∑
t=1
 N∑
i=1
h4it,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2u∗2i +
N∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
∑
l 6=i
h2it,0hkt,0hlt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2u∗ku∗l
+
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
h2it,0h
2
jt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j )u∗i u∗j
 = O((NT )−1).
Furthermore, A2 has the similar result except that we have to sum up the terms for all t 6= s,
t, s = 1, ..., T . Thus, we have A2 = O((N)
−1). Taking A1,A2 and (S.5) together, we have
Var
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)N−1 N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
 = O(N−1),
which implies T−1
∑T
t=1
(
N−1
∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)(
N−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0u
∗
j
)
= O(N−1/2). Therefore
T−1
[
G′N−1
N∑
i=1
hi,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
= Op(N
−1/2)
as required.
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Proof of Lemma (C4). Write
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
=N−2T−1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
E(h2it,0)E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2 = O(N−1), (S.6)
which holds by the assumption that E
[
(µ+0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗j)
]
= 0, E(h2it,0) < K and E(µ
+
0 −u∗i )2 <
K. Furthermore,
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)22
=T−2E
 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)4
+ T−2E
 T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2N−1 N∑
j=1
hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
2

=:A1 +A2.
Consider A1, in which expectation is non-zero only in the following case
A1 =N
−4T−2E
[
T∑
t=1
(
N∑
i=1
h4it,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )4
)]
+N−4T−2E
T∑
t=1
 N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
h2it,0h
2
jt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2(µ+0 − u∗j )2
 = O(N−2T−1),
where the result comes from assuming hit,0 and u
∗
i are independently distributed with finite fourth
moment, and the fact that u∗i ’s are cross-sectional independent. Now consider A2,
A2 =N
−4T−2E
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
[
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
hit,0hkt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )(µ+0 − u∗k)
]
×
 N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
hjs,0hls,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )(u∗l − µ+0 )
 ,
in which expectation is non-zero only in the following cases: (i) i = j = k = l, (ii) i = k, j = l (iii)
i = j, k = l, it follows that
A2 =N
−4T−2E
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
 N∑
i=1
h2it,0h
2
is,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )4 +
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
h2it,0h
2
js,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2(µ+0 − u∗j )2
+
N∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
hit,0his,0hkt,0hks,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2(µ+0 − u∗k)2
 = O(N−2).
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Taking A1, A2 and (S.6) together, we have
Var
T−1 T∑
t=1
(
N−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2 = O(N−2),
which implies T−1
∑T
t=1
(
N−1
∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
= Op(N
−1).
Proof of Lemma (C5). Recall that ξit =
 vit + β′eit
eit
, it is easy to show that its expectation
is 0 by the fact that vit, eit, hit,0 and u
∗
i are distributed independently. So we can write the variance
as
Var
[
T−1
T∑
t=1
ξitN
−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
=(NT )−2E
[
T∑
t=1
ξit
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]2
=(NT )−2
 T∑
t=1
E(ξitξ
′
it)E
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
)2
=(NT )−2
[
T∑
t=1
E(ξitξ
′
it)E
(
N∑
i=1
h2it,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2
)]
, (S.7)
the second equality holds by the fact that vit and eit are serially uncorrelated, and the third equal-
ity holds by u∗i are cross-sectionally independent. Furthermore, the term E||ξitξ′it|| < K by vit
and eit have finite variance, together with E(h
2
it,0) < K and E(µ
+
0 − u∗i )2 < K, we can obtain
Var
[
T−1
∑T
t=1 ξitN
−1∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 − u∗i )
]
= O((NT )−1). Therefore T−1
∑T
t=1 ξitN
−1∑N
i=1 hit,0(µ
+
0 −
u∗i ) = Op((NT )
−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C6). Given Lemmas (B5) and (B6), we already discussed two of three ele-
ments in G. It remains to show the rate of T−1
∑T
t=1 ξitN
−1∑N
i=1 hit,0u
∗
i . Consider its mean.
Again, given the fact that vit, eit, hit,0 and u
∗
i are distributed independently, it can be shown that
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the mean is 0. The variance,
Var
[
T−1
T∑
t=1
ξitN
−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0u
∗
i
]
=(NT )−2E
[
T∑
t=1
ξit
N∑
i=1
hit,0u
∗
i
]2
=(NT )−2
 T∑
t=1
E(ξitξ
′
it)E
(
N∑
i=1
hit,0u
∗
i
)2
=(NT )−2
 T∑
t=1
E(ξitξ
′
it)
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E(hit,0hjt,0)E(u
∗
i u
∗
j )
 ,
where the second equality holds as the same as preceding discuss that vit and eit are serially
uncorrelated. However, by expanding
(∑N
i=1 hit,0u
∗
i
)2
, it is Op(N
2) by the assumptions that
E(hit,0hjt,0) < K and E(u
∗
i u
∗
j) < K for all i, j. Together with E||ξitξ′it|| < K, we get
Var
[
T−1
T∑
t=1
ξitN
−1
N∑
i=1
hit,0u
∗
i
]
= O(T−1),
which implies T−1
∑T
t=1 ξitN
−1∑N
i=1 hit,0u
∗
i = Op(T
−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C7). Consider the mean. Because vit, eit, hit,0 and u
∗
i are mutually inde-
pendent, we can obtain the mean is 0 easily. Next, the variance,
Var
[
T−1
T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)ξ¯t
]
=T−2
T∑
t=1
E
(
u∗i (hit,0 − h¯i,0)
)2
E(ξ¯tξ¯
′
t)
=T−2
T∑
t=1
E(u∗2i )E(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2E(ξ¯tξ¯′t).
Notice that the above holds by the fact vit and eit are serially uncorrelated and assumptions
we used in the mean. Because we have E(u∗2i ) < K, E(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2 < K and the order of
E(ξ¯tξ¯
′
t) is O(N
−1). Thus, we have Var
[
T−1
∑T
t=1(uit − u¯i)ξ¯t
]
= O((NT )−1), and it follows that
T−1
∑T
t=1(uit − u¯i)ξ¯t = Op((NT )−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C8). We first consider its mean. Write,
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)N−1
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )

=(NT )−1
E T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)hit,0(µ+0 − u∗i ) + E
T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)
N∑
j 6=i
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
 ,
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where the second term inside the square brackets is 0 by the assumption that u∗i is cross-sectional
independent. Further, since uit = hit,0u
∗
i and using the assumptions that hit,0 and u
∗
i are mutually
independent with finite mean and variance, we get
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)N−1
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )

=(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
[
E(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)E(u∗2i − u∗iµ+)
]
= O(N−1). (S.8)
Consider the variance, we first evaluate the term
(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
2
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2u∗2i
(
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j)
)(
N∑
k=1
hkt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗k)
)
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)(his,0 − h¯i,0)u∗2i
(
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j)
)(
N∑
k=1
hks,0(µ
+
0 − u∗k)
) .
Note that the expected value of above equation is non-zero only in the case that j = k, so we can
rewrite them as
(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)
N∑
j=1
hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
2
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2u∗2i
N∑
j=1
h2jt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)(his,0 − h¯i,0)u∗2i
(
N∑
j=1
hjt,0hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )2
)
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)2(u∗iµ+0 − u∗2i )2 +
T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)u∗2i
N∑
j 6=i
h2jt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)(h2is,0 − his,0h¯i,0)(u∗iµ+0 − u∗2i )2
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)(his,0 − h¯i,0)u∗2i
(
N∑
j 6=i
hjt,0hjs,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )2
) . (S.9)
Given the assumptions that hit,0 and u
∗
i are mutually independent with finite fourth moment, the
first term inside square brackets divided by (NT )2 is O(N−2T−1). Using the similar argument, the
third term divided by (NT )2 is O(N−2). Further, since u∗i is cross-sectional independent and hit,0 is
covariance stationary process, the second and fourth terms divided by (NT )2 are (NT )−1. Thus,
by summarizing (S.8) and (S.9), we have Var
[
T−1
∑T
t=1(uit − u¯i)N−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j )
]
=
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O(N−2) + O((NT )−1). Therefore, we obtain T−1
∑T
t=1(uit − u¯i)N−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0(µ
+
0 − u∗j) =
Op(N
−1) +Op((NT )−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C9). Since hit,0, Dt and ft are independent stationary process, it is easy to
obtain T−1((ui − u¯i)′D) = Op(T−1/2) and T−1((ui − u¯i)′F) = Op(T−1/2). The remains can be
denoted as T−1
∑T
t=1(uit− u¯i)N−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0u
∗
j , and using the similar arguments in Lemma (C8),
the mean,
E
T−1 T∑
t=1
(uit − u¯i)N−1
N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j

=(NT )−1
E T∑
t=1
(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)u∗2i + E
T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)u∗i
N∑
j 6=i
hjt,0u
∗
j

=(NT )−1
[
T∑
t=1
E(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)E(u∗2i )
]
= O(N−1). (S.10)
The second equality holds by the fact that hit,0 is cross-sectional independent with E[
∑T
t=1(hit,0−
h¯i,0)] = 0. The result holds by hit,0 and u
∗
i are mutually independent with finite mean and variance.
Next, we consider
(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)u∗i
N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
2
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2u∗2i
(
N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
)(
N∑
k=1
hkt,0u
∗
k
)
+
T∑
t=1
T∑
s6=t
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)(his,0 − h¯i,0)u∗2i
(
N∑
j=1
hjt,0u
∗
j
)(
N∑
k=1
hks,0u
∗
k
)
=(NT )−2E
 T∑
t=1
(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)2u∗4i +
T∑
t=1
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)2u∗2i
 N∑
j 6=i
N∑
k 6=i
hjt,0hkt,0u
∗
ju
∗
k

+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(h2it,0 − hit,0h¯i,0)(h2is,0 − his,0h¯i,0)u∗4i
+
T∑
t=1
∑
s6=t
(hit,0 − h¯i,0)(his,0 − h¯i,0)
 N∑
j 6=i
N∑
k 6=i
hjt,0hks,0u
∗
ju
∗
k
 . (S.11)
The above expressions are quite similar with (C8), the assumptions that hit,0 and u
∗
i are mu-
tually independent with finite fourth moment imply the first and third terms divided by (NT )2
are O(N−2T−1) and O(N−2). The difference is that the case j 6= k is non-zero here, thus the
second and forth terms divided by (NT )2 are O(T−1). Taking (S.10) and(S.11) together, we
have Var
[
T−1
∑T
t=1(hit,0 − h¯i,0)u∗iN−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0(u
∗
j − µ+0 )
]
= O(N−2) +O(T−1), which implies
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T−1
∑T
t=1(hit,0 − h¯i,0)u∗iN−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0(u
∗
j − µ+0 ) = Op(N−1) +Op(T−1/2).
Proof of Lemma (C10). The proof of (C10) is quite similar to the last part of (C9) except we
drop u∗i from (uit − u¯i) and do not evaluate at true value of δ. We still have the same result that
is T−1
∑T
t=1(hit − h¯i)N−1
∑N
j=1 hjt,0u
∗
j = Op(N
−1) +Op(T−1/2).
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